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CEDES, Buenos Aires, ArgentinaWhat are the questions?
¾ Is industrial policy still relevant? What policies are relevant? 
The paper focuses on these questions. But an additional question is key 
to understanding the LA experience:
¾ What factors enabled some countries to successfully 
implement their industrial policies; while these policies 
quickly  failed in others? Implementation “Details” are Essential
¾ Similar policies have different effects because of uncertainty 
concerning the links: institutionsÎpoliciesÎoutcomes.
¾ The idiosyncratic features of the socio-economic structure 
generate: 
• path-dependence and sequencing problems, 
• macro disequilibria and financial crises, 
• unintended distributional impacts and political unrest. Hence,
¾ A canonical blueprint may be too rough a guideline for policy 
reform. It is important
• To design context-informed policy packages and to rectify during the 
implementation stage
• To facilitate social (institutional/organizational) learningWeiss: Lessons About Industrial Policy 
(East Asia)
1. The ability to stimulate high private investment in new 
manufacturing , which led to productivity improvements 
and exports is the key. What role for aggregate volatility 
and structural factors?
2. Industrial policy must be flexible: Who are the policy 
actors? Distributional conflict? “Rigid” institutions?
3. The role of directed credit policy has been much 
debated. What about the Korean/Indonesian/Thai 
financial crises? How to manage risk?Weiss: Guidance for Countries 
Æ Export orientation (The RER? The Monetary Regime? 
Protectionism? Factor Endowment?)
Æ Time-bound support (Political economy?)
Æ Support in relation to well defined performance criteria 
(What criteria if volatile/conflictive context?) 
Æ A focus on innovation and technological upgrading
Æ Coordination of initiatives (What about coordination 
failures and bad rules of the game?)
Æ Flexibility (Who should be flexible? Institutional 
arrangement?) Reforms Are Processes of Institutional Change
¾ Industrial policies call for institution building but there is no 
such a thing as an interest-free institutional engineer. 
¾ The identification of the agents of change and their collective 
action problems is as important as the identification of the 
“best industrial policy”. 
¾ The ability to make political transactions is key to institution 
building Î Political institutions matter.The Political Economy Dimension is Key
¾ Distributive conflicts are primary determinants of the 
content and path of industrial policies and it is very difficult
to organize compensation arrangements.
¾ In addition to “traditional” interest groups: 
• elites; regional/ ethnic cleavages; fiscal federalism
• State capture is frequent and lobbying at the 
implementation stage is typical.
¾ Problem: The political economy is not in the blueprint. Aggregate Volatility Matters
¾ Emerging Economies are highly volatile: it is difficult to 
separate stabilization and industrial policies: “fear of floating”; 
sterilization and reserve accumulation. 
¾ Macroeconomic volatility is inimical to institution building: 
Crises induce institutional disarray: Indonesia vs. Korea. 
¾ Resilience to external shocks is key: Investment in Thailand; 
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Source: World Develompment Indicators.Volatility and Shocks
¾ Volatile countries grow slowly but volatile sectors within countries grow 
fast: cyclical comovement is more synchronized across sectors in low 
growth and volatile countries.
¾ The economic structure may be a source of excessive volatility if 
increasing productive specialization makes the economy more vulnerable 
to shocks and international markets do not help to manage this increased 
vulnerability. 
 US commodity-producing regions are more volatile.
 UE “peripheral” countries are more volatile.
 In Mercosur, the bulk of cyclical movements are explained by idiosyncratic 
country risk
 The common cycle in Mercosur correlates with country risk premia. The GDN Project reveals that Successes/Failures
are associated with ….
¾ The quality of the state: a rapid and correct response to 
shocks; the management of distributional conflicts; the 
quality of bureaucracy.
¾ External shocks are important influences.
¾ The ability of society to learn in a context of coordination 
failures (ideologies and behavioral patterns matter) 
• Many countries repeat the same mistakes
• Distributional conflicts affect the ability to learn and to cooperate.
¾ Significant differences  in the ability to solve collective action 
problems and undertake political transactions: 
• Democratization, the search for legitimacy by authoritarian regimes, and 
civil society are key factors.